After the Arab Spring: power shift in the Middle East?: Iran and the Arab Spring by Rafati, Naysan
  
Naysan Rafati 
After the Arab Spring: power shift in the 
Middle East?: Iran and the Arab Spring 
 
Report 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Rafati, Naysan (2012) After the Arab Spring: power shift in the Middle East?: Iran and the Arab 
Spring. IDEAS reports - special reports, Kitchen, Nicholas (ed.) SR011. LSE IDEAS, London 
School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43466/ 
 
Originally available from LSE IDEAS 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: May 2012 
 
© 2012 The Author 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
 
 
49
Iran and the Arab Spring 
 Naysan Rafati 
The events of the Arab Spring, it has been argued, have their precursors in Iran. Yet the proponents of such a view are split over which Iran it is that serves as the inspiration for 
events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere: is it, as some officials from the Islamic Republic 
claim, their own 1979 revolution, which unseated Mohammad Reza Pahlavi from the Peacock 
Throne, or the Twittering, YouTubing mass protests against that vision of a Republic which 
spilled into the streets of Tehran and other cities around the country three decades later? 
The first point, which relates to Iran’s domestic situation, is that despite the precedent for public protest 
in Iran, most notably in the form of the Green Movement which emerged after the contested reelection 
of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009, a resurgence of anti-government activism galvanised by 
the Arab Spring does not seem forthcoming, at least in the short-term. Secondly, while analyses of Iran’s 
role in the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East may diverge in their conclusions, they acknowledge, 
implicitly or outright, that Iran matters. This would inevitably have been the case given the country’s 
position as a regional power based on indicators such as population and geography, economic strength, 
and military capability, but the religious ideology which underpins the regime, coupled with the policy 
stances it maintains on issues such as nuclear proliferation and the Arab-Israeli conflict, have failed to 
endear it to the West and some other influential Middle Eastern powers. Indeed, the argument could be 
made that, from Washington to Brussels to Riyadh, ongoing concern particularly over Iranian enrichment 
and a potential weapons capability contribute to the fact that Iranian engagement with countries in the 
Arab world is rarely viewed in isolation, and that this apprehension predates the transformative events 
of recent months. Thus in terms of shifting regional politics and Iran’s role within the context of these 
changes, the Arab Spring has served to highlight the extent to which relations between actors can not 
be confined to a bilateral context. Finally, the still-uncertain fate of the protests in Syria, Iran’s closest ally 
in the Middle East, underscores both the tension between rhetoric and interest facing Tehran, as well 
as representing perhaps the single most important strategic challenge that Iran will need to deal with 
as a result of the ongoing turmoil, with potentially far-reaching implications for its regional influence.
INTERNAL POLITICS AND IRAN’S VIEWS OF THE ARAB SPRING 
If the Arab Spring has shown that regimes which appear stable can prove surprisingly weak, Iran might 
be considered weak yet surprisingly stable thus far when it comes to its domestic politics. Whatever 
the nature of the link between Iran’s 2009 protests and the eruption of demonstrations throughout 
the Arab world over the course of 2011 and 2012, the primary areas of contestation within the Iranian 
political scene, as witnessed during the parliamentary elections held in March of this year, are no longer 
taking place between reformists and conservatives. Rather, they are increasingly taking place within 
and between conservative factions who pledge fidelity to the existing system even while promoting 
different visions for it. Iran’s protesters, with their use of mass demonstrations and social media, may 
have foreshadowed what would take place in Tahrir Square and elsewhere, but a combination of internal 
weaknesses within the movement compounded by a robust and uncompromising response from the 
government against the opposition and its leadership has seemingly quieted the voices of dissent. 
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Nevertheless, as the rapidity and unpredictability of 
the protests elsewhere have shown, the potential for 
a rekindling of Iran’s internal divisions can certainly 
not be ruled out, particularly as sanctions against the 
country chip away at the already fractured economic 
and commercial foundations of the Iranian state. 
If the domestic political situation within Iran is one 
of relative stability though not assured strength, for 
the time being, the question then becomes how the 
Iranian regime views developments across the region: 
where it may sense opportunity, and where it may 
perceive threat. In other words, how will changes 
taking place within countries impact relations between 
countries, not only within a particular bilateral context 
but in a broader regional framework? The narrative 
expounded by Tehran has been broadly welcoming and 
supportive, but coloured by a specific interpretation of 
what has given cause to the uprisings; Iran’s Supreme 
Leader, Ali Khamenei, has described developments 
as a ‘widespread awakening of nations, which is 
directed towards Islamic goals.’ Using the language 
of ‘Islamic Awakening’ (Bidari-ye Eslami) seeks to find 
and develop commonalities between the raison d’être 
of the Iranian state and the protests, not only as a 
correlation to be drawn upon and exploited but as 
causation as well: ‘the wave of the Islamic awakening 
resonated through the Islamic world as an export of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran,’ one senior Iranian official 
has maintained. This interpretation, however, is at 
best little more than a partial explanation. While the 
increasing visibility of Salafist groups and organisations 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt would seem 
to proffer fertile grounds for growing influence, the 
reality of developments is not so straightforward. 
Religion and religiously-oriented groups have clearly 
played a part throughout the course of the Arab 
Spring, but how that will translate over the course of 
political transitions remains unclear. Moreover, even 
if Islamist parties consolidate themselves in positions 
of power, there are certainly no assurances that the 
model of the Islamic Republic offers any blueprint or 
idealised form for their mode of governance, or that 
a shared commitment to religion in political life will 
necessarily entail a closer strategic relationship to 
Tehran. Indeed, the politics of the Middle East have 
demonstrated that the compatible of ideologies or 
sectarian beliefs are no guarantor of harmonious 
relations, any more than a seeming incompatibility 
precludes them. Syrian-Iranian ties, bringing together 
a Persian, Shia theocracy with an Arab nationalist 
state, offer a case in point. 
THE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
One of the striking features of the Arab Spring in 
relation to Iran has been the difficulty of isolating any 
single bilateral relationship from a broader matrix of 
regional and international dynamics within which the 
events of 2011-2012 must be examined. Regional 
divisions and competition for influence and power 
are, of course, a longstanding feature of Middle 
Eastern politics, but of greatest relevance to present 
developments may be the emerging ‘Cold War’ 
between the two Gulf powers, Iran and the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, which has become increasingly chilly 
since the fall of the Ba’ath in Iraq in 2003 and the 
consequently weakened geopolitical role of Baghdad. F. 
Gregory Gause III notes that in recent years ‘the Saudis 
have pursued a policy of balancing against, rolling back 
where possible, Iranian influence in the Arab world.’ 
If the Cold War analogy can be pushed, Bahrain may 
increasingly be seen as one of several potential Berlins 
– places where the two camps play out their rivalries, 
and whereby an integral aspect of Tehran-Manama 
relations cannot fail to take into consideration the 
position and interests of Riyadh. On the one hand, the 
grievances of the Kingdom’s majority Shia population 
give a sectarian basis around which Iran can frame its 
concerns; ‘the Bahraini nation is an oppressed nation,’ 
Khamenei has opined. On the other hand the specter 
of Iranian interference unquestionably helped provoke 
the Saudi show of force that has buttressed the rule 
of the Al-Khalifa family. 
This competition for influence between regional actors 
is compounded by the international, or perhaps more 
specifically Western, view of Iran as a destablising 
force in a volatile region. This outlook has been 
held by Washington since the hostage crisis that 
accompanied the birth of the Islamic Republic, and 
has been solidified over subsequent years as a result of 
Iranian support for terrorism and the country’s human 
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rights record. Over the last decade, however, and 
in the past few years in particular, it is the controversy 
over Iran’s nuclear programme which has galvanised 
international cooperation against Iran. Sanctions 
are being regularly deepened and broadened by 
international, regional, and national actors, and 
represent one of several means through which Iran 
is being penalised for the irreconcilability of its nuclear 
project with foreign concerns. Iran has, of course, 
consistently argued that its enrichment activities are 
aimed to serve the exclusively peaceful ends of medical 
research and power generation rather than a weapons 
capability. And while the argument could be made 
that it is the legalistic nuances of proliferation and 
the agreements that govern it which motivate the 
sanctioning of Iran, the case could also be that it is 
the particular characteristics of Iranian policy which 
exacerbate the perception of threat. In other words, 
Iran’s proliferation is a danger because of Iran’s policies 
in other areas, while its proliferation in turn makes 
it more of a threat. The resumption of negotiations 
between the P5+1 (the US, UK, France, Russia, China, 
and Germany) and Iran in mid-April after more than 
a year, with a pledge to follow up with further talks, 
gives some cause to be optimistic about the prospects 
for an eventual diplomatic settlement, though the road 
to a major breakthrough remains long and potholed.
The promises and pitfalls of the Arab Spring can 
therefore be seen as part of a larger picture in which 
Iran’s advances and setbacks are linked to efforts 
to curtail its influence and ambitions. This is the 
fundamental issue preoccupying Western policy 
makers: how to stymie Iranian advances into the 
vacuums that have emerged in the wake of the Arab 
Spring at a time when the perceived need to limit its 
influence, limit its trade, and limit its ambitions has 
been greatly heightened. 
THE UNCERTAINTIES OF UPHEAVAL 
The preceding paragraphs have highlighted two points, 
namely that Iran’s interpretive framework of the Arab 
Spring explains what is taking place as favourable 
to its values and compatible with its interests, and 
that the regional and international context is broadly 
unsympathetic to seeing Tehran reap dividends from 
the changes taking place. Developments in the Levant 
give reason to question the first and underscore the 
second. While the uprising in Syria can be seen as 
a continuation of changes taking place elsewhere, 
bringing various forces together in opposition to 
a repressive and unrepresentative government, the 
narrative of religiously-inspired regional awakening 
proffered by the Islamic Republic can only be 
maintained by distinguishing the opposition to the 
rule of Bashar Al-Assad and his coterie from protests 
elsewhere. Thus, while Egypt, Libya, Tunisia et. al. 
reflect a nation’s resistance to oppression and a growing 
popular religious consciousness, the repression of 
demonstrators in Hama, Homs, and elsewhere in Syria 
is, in Tehran’s telling, a byproduct of foreign schemes 
rather than any reflection of legitimate indigenous 
grievances. Accounts in the Iranian press accordingly 
reel off a long list of countries in their reports on the 
Arab Spring – Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen will inevitably make 
their appearances – whilst Syria’s unrest is conspicuous 
by its absence. ‘The Americans and certain Western 
countries want to take revenge on Syria for their 
recent defeats in the region,’ Khamenei has explained. 
‘The main purpose of the United States’ plot in Syria 
is to deal a blow to the resistance front in the region 
because Syria is supporting the resistance of Palestine 
and the Islamic Resistance of Lebanon.’ Shortly after 
the Friends of Syria announced that it would bankroll 
the Free Syrian Army, Iran’s Defence Minister asked 
‘why do some countries promote civil war in Syria 
and support terrorist groups? If they want to help 
Syria why do not they support the trend of reforms 
and referendum which has begun in the country?’ In 
Tehran’s telling, then, while other regimes crumbled 
because they did not adhere to its own worldview 
and values, Damascus’s burden has been shouldered 
because it has. The Iranian opposition, by contrast, 
has come out in favour of the uprising, deeming it 
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‘an anti-dictatorial movement seeking freedom,’ and 
viewing their own country’s role with ‘deep regret.’ The 
image of two hands, one in Iranian colours bearing the 
slogan ‘where is my vote?’ and the other painted in 
the green, white, black and red standard of the Syrian 
opposition, form the image of a dove to illustrate 
their sympathies. 
To be sure, the fall of the House of Assad is without 
question be the single most significant geostrategic 
setback Iran could end up facing as a result of the 
Arab Spring, depriving Iran of a stalwart regional 
partner as well as its collaborator in the support of 
groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. And while 
the dissolution of a three decade-long Syrian-Iranian 
relationship would certainly be a blow in and of itself, 
the growing internationalisation of the conflict raises 
the stakes further, given that the increasingly assertive 
role of the Gulf States as well as Turkey in supporting 
and bankrolling the opposition undoubtedly adds 
to Iran’s concerns. Reports are legion about active 
Iranian assistance to the Syrian regime to counter 
this possibility, and Western officials believe that 
training, weapons, and means to observe and disrupt 
the technological tools utilised by protesters have all 
been making their way to Damascus courtesy of the 
Iranian government. Iran is likely to continue standing 
shoulder to shoulder with Assad, supporting reforms 
by the regime instead of changes in regime, for as 
long as it can.
CONCLUSION
The opportunities and challenges that the Arab Spring 
has brought for Iran’s leadership are complex and 
multifaceted. While the Islamic Republic seeks to 
stamp its imprimatur on regional events and situate 
them within a narrative resonant of its own, as 
successor regimes eventually emerge in Arab states 
such as Egypt and Libya, and the uprisings in Syria and 
Bahrain reach some sort of resolution, their specific 
dyadic relationships with Iran will undoubtedly witness 
varying degrees of reassessment based on perceptions 
of interests and ideological compatibility. Will Cairo-
Tehran relations flourish in the wake of Mubarak, 
abetted by the Islamists, or will other factors rule 
out such reconciliation? To what extent will the 
Al-Khalifa family be able to satisfy the demands 
of the Bahraini opposition, and, having already 
received the assistance of their neighbours to the west, 
address relations with the neighbour to the north? 
Speculating on the exact contours that will emerge 
remains, of course, impossible – the region’s capacity 
to upend expectations and confound conventional 
thinking has already been amply demonstrated. Taking 
a broader view suggests that developments at the 
bilateral, regional, and international levels give more 
reasons to question Iran’s ability to project its influence 
and power across the changing face of the region 
than there are to anticipate it. ■  
